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In 2017, under a new Federal Communications Commission (FCC) director, 
the FCC removed the current net neutrality regulations and developed a plan for 
protecting an open Internet with fewer regulations.1 As of 2018, the former net 
neutrality regulations have officially been repealed. Many U.S. citizens and 
others around the world worry that this will have a negative impact on consumers 
and allow Internet service providers and Internet platforms to take advantage of 
consumers if left unregulated. While the current scheme in the United States is 
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have taken a more rigorous stance on protecting neutrality on the Internet. Net 
neutrality and platform neutrality have more recently become prominent topics 
around the world.  
This Note will examine the European Union’s net neutrality regulations, 
France’s recently adopted platform neutrality regulations, and the United States’ 
current lack of Internet regulations. It will also discuss whether the United States 
should rethink its decision to abandon net neutrality and adopt either the 
European Union or French approach to Internet regulation. To understand how 
the regulations exist in their current state around the world, this Note will begin 
with the history of Internet regulation in the European Union, France, and the 
United States. This Note will then analyze the current regulations for net 
neutrality, platform neutrality, and a discriminatory Internet regime that lacks 
formal legal regulation. This Note will evaluate the effectiveness of each 
approach both from an economic standpoint and in terms of social impact. This 
Note will conclude with a recommendation for the United States moving 
forward in an Internet-driven world. 
 
 
I. HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTERNET REGULATION AND THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY SCHEME 
 
A. NET NEUTRALITY 
 
Since the early 1990s and the beginning of the surge in Internet usage, the 
European Union (EU) has been concerned with how Internet service providers 
should be regulated. In March of 2002, the EU passed Directive 2002/22/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council (the “Directive”) on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services (Universal Service).2 The Directive’s intent was to define the type of 
universal service obligations of telecommunications and network services.3 It 
stated that each member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be able 
to define the obligations of its universal service providers and that those 
obligations would not be viewed as anti-competitive, so long as they are 
administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral 
manner.4 At the time the Directive was passed, the primary method of Internet 
service was through dial-up Internet connection that was directly linked to 
telephone networks.5 Therefore, the Directive was linked to both forms of 
telecommunication. This was the first time the EU began addressing the issue of 
Internet neutrality. Various other regulations and directives were passed by the 
EU from 2003 through 2015. These include: Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 




2 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal 
Service and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Universal 
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communications sector, Regulation No. 1211/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), and Regulation No. 
531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 on 
roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (recast).6  
In 2015, the EU passed its first regulation that directly addressed the issue 
of Internet neutrality and amended prior directives and regulations. Regulation 
No. 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 set out the measures for regulating open Internet access.7 Article 1 of the 
regulation defines the subject matter and scope of the regulation as 
“establish[ing] common rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory 
treatment of traffic in the provision of Internet access services and related end-
users’ rights.”8 Article 2 provides definitions for the regulation.   
Article 3 of the regulation discusses the safeguarding of open Internet access 
among the EU states and includes five restrictions. The first restriction states 
that Internet users have certain rights that include accessing and distributing 
information and content, using application services, and using one’s own choice 
of equipment to access the Internet.9 These rights are not impeded by the Internet 
user’s location, the location of the Internet provider, or the location of the 
destination or origin of the information.10 The second restriction deals with 
agreements between Internet users and providers of Internet access. This 
restriction states that the agreements dealing with conditions and characteristics 
of Internet services (for example, price, data volumes, speed) are not allowed to 
limit the rights given to Internet users in the first restriction.11 The third 
restriction requires Internet service providers to treat all Internet traffic equally. 
This means that the Internet service provider may not discriminate, restrict or 
interfere with Internet traffic based on the sender or receiver, the content of the 
Internet activity, the applications used, or equipment used by Internet users.12 
However, this third restriction imposes limitations on its explanation of treating 
all Internet traffic equally. This restriction does not prevent an Internet service 
provider from implementing reasonable Internet traffic measures. The restriction 
goes on to explain reasonable Internet traffic measures as those that are 
transparent, non-discriminatory, proportionate, and based on objectively 




6 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning 
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector 
(Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201); Regulation No. 1211/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 Establishing the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 2002 O.J. (L 337); Regulation No. 
531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 on Roaming on Public Mobile 
Communications Networks Within the Union (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 172/10). 
7 Regulation No. 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 
Laying Down Measures Concerning Open Internet Access and Amending Directive 2002/22/EC and 
Regulation No. 531/2012 on Roaming on Public Mobile Communications Networks Within the Union 
531/2012, Official Journal of the European Communities, 2015 O.J. (L 310/1). 
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goes on to state that beyond the management measures set forth above, the 
Internet service providers shall not block, slow down, alter, restrict, interfere 
with, or degrade certain content or applications. However, they may except as 
made necessary to comply with EU legislative acts or national legislation that 
complies with EU law, to preserve the integrity and security of the network for 
Internet users, or to prevent network congestion as long as equivalent categories 
of Internet traffic are treated the same.14 The fourth restriction requires that any 
Internet traffic management measure may only include processing of an Internet 
user’s personal data if the processing of that data is necessary and proportionate 
to meet the objectives from the third restriction. It states that the processing of 
personal data may only occur in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.15 The fifth 
and final restriction in Article 3 states that Internet service providers are free to 
offer services in addition to Internet access services that optimize certain 
content, applications, or services, when it is necessary for a particular quality 
level for the Internet user.16 However, those providers may only offer those 
additional services if the network has the capacity to do so without hurting the 
availability or quality of other users’ Internet access.17 
Article 4 of the regulation sets forth the transparency measures required by 
Internet service providers in their contracts for Internet service.18 The contracts 
must set forth certain information, give clear and comprehensible explanations 
of the service relating to volume, speed, and services, available remedies for 
disputes, and publication of certain information.19 Article 5 addresses the 
regulation and enforcement of Articles 3 and 4 which are to occur by national 
regulatory authorities with the guidance of BEREC.20 Article 6 states that the 
penalties for failing to abide by the regulation will be defined individually by 
the member states and must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive enough 
so as to make sure the regulation is being properly implemented.21 
In August of 2016, BEREC published guidelines for following Regulation 
No. 2015/2120.22 Article 5(3) of Regulation No. 2015/2120 expressly gives 
BEREC the power to issue guidelines on net neutrality for reliance by national 
regulatory authorities.23 The Regulation went into effect as of April 30, 2016 








14 Id. at 8–9. 




19 Id.  
20 Id. at 10. 
21 Id.  
22 Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (2016) BEREC Guidelines on the 
Implementation by National Regulators of European Net Neutrality Rules, BoR (16) 127, https://berec. 
europa.eu/eng/netneutrality/. 
23 All You Need to Know about Net Neutrality Rules in the EU, BEREC, https://berec.europa.eu/ 
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B. PLATFORM NEUTRALITY 
 
The Internet neutrality regulations imposed by the EU are the minimum net 
neutrality restrictions that must be enforced by the member states. Certain 
member states have chosen to go beyond the limitations imposed by the EU and 
develop either stricter regulations for Internet neutrality or adopt other forms of 
Internet regulation of neutrality. France in particular has adopted laws for the 
implementation and regulation of platform neutrality.  
The development of platform neutrality legislation began in May 2014, 
when the French National Digital Council (FNDC) published a report on 
platform neutrality.24 The report laid out four sets of recommendations deemed 
as priority areas to ensure neutrality by and within the Internet and more 
particularly Internet platforms.25 The first recommendation focused on 
bolstering the effectiveness of the law in relation to digital platforms. The FNDC 
recommended making better use of current laws and curbing legal and economic 
uncertainty, using rating agencies to gauge neutrality levels, getting 
transparency guarantees from platforms and making them available to users, and 
receiving guarantees from the platforms that their models are sustainable.26 The 
next recommendation was to ensure data system fairness when used by 
platforms.27 This means that platforms are benefiting from collecting personal 
data and digital footprints and this information needs to be organized and kept 
in compliance to guarantee sustainable development.28 This can be done through 
introducing a general obligation of fair usage of all data that goes beyond the 
notion of final usage, giving users final control over the data concerning their 
online activities and the implication of the use of that data, fostering data fluidity, 
moving beyond personal data and developing a legal framework for digital 
footprints, creating heightened transparency and information requirements for 
platforms, and maintaining fairness between dominant platforms and their 
users.29 The third recommendation was to invest in skills and knowledge to 
bolster competitiveness.30 This means developing knowledge of the digital 
world in support of this overarching strategic approach to platform neutrality 
and using that knowledge to develop digital literacy for individuals, businesses, 
and the community.31 The last recommendation of the FNDC was to set the 
proper conditions to allow alternative neutral platforms to emerge.32 This is 
achieved by promoting an open digital development model and building a 
sustainable digital society by promoting these values and recommendations 
nationally to other countries.33 After going through its recommendations, the 




24 FRENCH DIGITAL COUNCIL, FRENCH DIGITAL COUNCIL REP. ON PLATFORM NEUTRALITY, 
OPINION NO. 2014-2 (2014). 
25 Id. at 6. 
26 Id. at 7–8. 
27 Id. at 9–12. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 13. 
31 Id. at 13–14. 
32 Id. at 15–17. 
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through ensuring that the Internet’s role as a catalyst for innovation, creation, 
expression, and exchange is not undermined by development strategies that 
close it off.34 Further, platform neutrality includes transparency and equity in 
collecting, processing, and retrieving information; non-discrimination between 
forms of expression and shared content; non-monopolization of information 
production means; non-discrimination in terms of socioeconomic status for 
access to platforms; and non-discrimination in the technical compatibility or 
interoperability requirements with platforms.35 The EU did not adopt a platform 
neutrality approach following the publication of the FNDC’s report but instead 
developed net neutrality regulations.  
Following the EU’s adoption of Regulation No. 2015/2120, France passed 
Law No. 2016-1321 for a Digital Republic of 7 October 2016, which defined the 
Internet as a public right similar to that of water and electricity and laid out the 
definition of an online platform operator.36 The law imposed new obligations on 
companies that fell under the definition of online platform operator, which aims 
to ensure loyalty towards consumers by encouraging transparency and the 
respect of information duties.37 About a year later, France passed three decrees 
that focused on the loyalty of online platform operators and worked to 
implement the law which had been set forth in Law No. 2016-1321 for a Digital 
Republic.38 These decrees set forth rules for online platform providers to ensure 
that the webpages are providing consumers with fair, clear, and transparent 
information.39 Discussion of the three decrees regarding platform neutrality 
follows. 
 
1. Decree No. 2017-1434 of 29 September 2017 
 
Decree No. 2017-1434 focuses on the information obligations of online 
platforms operators.40 These obligations apply to Article L111-7 of the French 
Consumer Code and became enforceable as of January 1, 2018.41 Article L111-
7(I) of the French Consumer Code defines an online platform operator as any 
natural person or legal entity offering, on a professional basis, free of charge or 
against payment, an online communication service to the public, based on either: 
(1) the ranking or referencing, through the use of computerized algorithms, of 
contents, goods, or services offered or uploaded by third-parties; or (2) the 




34 Id. at 19.  
35 Id. at 19. 
36 Julien-Alexis Defromont, Obligations for Digital Platforms Under French Consumer Law: New 
Implementing Decrees Regarding Transparency and Loyalty Published, FIELDFISHER TECH. AND 
OUTSOURCING BLOG, (Nov. 21, 2017), https://technologyandoutsourcingblog.fieldfisher.com/2017/ 
obligations-for-digital-platforms-under-french-consumer-law-new-implementing-decrees-regarding-
transparency-and-loyalty-published. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.; Décret 2017-1434 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif aux obligations d'information des opérateurs 
de plateformes numériques [Decree No. 2017-1434 of September Sept. 29, 2017 on the Information 
Obligations of Digital Platform Operators], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], 







88 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 10:1 
 
services, or the exchange or sharing of contents, goods, or services.42 The 
information obligations of online platform operators includes providing 
information on the methods for referencing, dereferencing, and ranking content, 
disclosure of the existence of a capitalistic link or remuneration between the 
platform operator and the referenced provider, and additional obligations for 
those online platform operators whose activity falls within the scope of Article 
L111-7(I)(2) of the French Consumer Code.43 Article L111-7(I)(2) includes 
online platform operators which function as a “marketplace” such that it brings 
together several parties for the sale of goods, the provision of services, or the 
exchange or sharing of contents, goods, or services.44 The online platform 
operators which are contained in Article L111-7(I)(2) must make the following 
information available when applicable: (1) the capacity of the persons authorized 
to submit an offer of goods and services, including in particular their status as a 
professional or a consumer; (2) a description of the contact-intermediation 
service and the nature and purpose of the contracts that can be concluded under 
this service; (3) the price of the contact-intermediation service or the method 
used to calculate this price, as well as the price of any additional paid services, 
whenever the costs of these services are borne by the consumer; (4) the payment 
procedure for the financial transaction and the way it is managed, whether 
directly or by a third party; (5) the insurance and warranties offered by the 
platform operator; and (6) the dispute resolution process and the role of the 
platform operator in such process.45 
 
2. Decree No. 2017-1435 of 29 September 2017 
 
Decree No. 2017-1435 sets a connections threshold from which online 
platform operators shall develop and disseminate best practices to enhance the 
loyalty, clarity, and transparency of the information transmitted to consumers.46 
This regulation applies only to operators with more than five million unique 
users per month and became enforceable as of January 1, 2019.47 This regulation 
is aimed at holding high volume online platform operators to a higher standard 






42 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 111-7 (Fr.); Flore Foyatier, Handbook on the New 
Transparency and Fairness Requirements Imposed on Operators of Digital Platforms Since January 1, 
2018, SOULIER AVOCATS, (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.soulier-avocats.com/en/handbook-on-the-new-
transparency-and-fairness-requirements-imposed-on-operators-of-digital-platforms-since-january-1-
2018/. 
43 See Foyatier, supra note 42. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.; Décret n° 2017-1435 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif à la fixation d'un seuil de connexions à partir 
duquel les opérateurs de plateformes en ligne élaborent et diffusent des bonnes pratiques pour renforcer 
la loyauté, la clarité et la transparence des informations transmises aux consommateurs [Decree No. 2017-
1435 of September 29, 2017 on the Determination of the Connection Threshold Above Which the 
Operators of Digital Platforms Must Establish and Make Available to Consumers Good Practices 
Guidelines Aimed at Strengthening the Fairness, Clarity and Transparency of the Information Provided 
to Consumers], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2017/9/29/ECOC1716648D/jo/texte. 
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3. Decree No. 2017-1436 of 29 September 2017 
 
Decree No. 2017-1436 sets forth the information requirements relating to 
online consumer notices.48 This applies to Article L111-7-II of the French 
Consumer Code and became enforceable as of January 1, 2018.49 These 
regulations for online consumer notices apply to any online platform operator 
whose primary or secondary purpose consists of the collection, moderation, or 
publication of online consumer reviews.50 The decree defines online consumer 
reviews as the expression of the opinion of a consumer from his or her 
consumption experience based on either any qualitative or quantitative elements 
of evaluation.51 It does not matter whether or not the consumer has bought the 
product or service which he or she is reviewing.52 The following information 
must be available on the webpage near the reviews: (1) the existence or absence 
of a procedure to monitor the reviews; (2) the date of the publication of each 
review and the date of the consumer’s experience described in the review; and 
(3) the criteria used for classifying the reviews, including the reviews that are 
just displayed in chronological order.53 There are also additional requirements 
for information that must be made available on a specific easily accessible 
section of the webpage depending on whether the reviews are monitored or not. 
Regardless of whether the reviews are monitored or not, the platform operator 
must make available the existence or absence of compensation in exchange for 
a review and the maximum period of time the review is published and will stay 
online.54 If the reviews are monitored by the online platform operator, then the 
following information requirements also apply: (1) the main features of the 
monitoring process at the time the reviews are collected, moderated, or 
published; (2) if applicable, the possibility to contact the consumer who wrote 
the review; (3) the possibility or impossibility to amend a review, and if 
applicable the procedure for amending a review; and (4) reasons why the 
publication of a review may be refused by the online platform operator.55 
If not specified in the particular decree, the information referenced in the 
decrees must be published in a section of the platform’s webpage.56 It must be 
easily accessible from all pages on the webpage and the information must not 
require a user to identify him or herself in order to access the information.57  
Article L131-4 of the French Consumer Code contains the penalties for non-




48 Id.; Décret n° 2017-1436 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif aux obligations d'information relatives aux 
avis en ligne de consommateurs [Decree No. 2017-1436 of September 29, 2017 on Information 
Requirements Relating to Online Consumer Reviews], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2017/9/29/ECOC 
1716649D/jo/texte. 
49 Foyatier, supra note 42. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
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compliance is punishable by an administrative fine of up to EUR 75,000 for 
natural persons and EUR 375,000 for legal entities.59 
 
 
II. U.S. NET NEUTRALITY HISTORY AND REVOCATION 
 
A. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF INTERNET REGULATION 
 
Internet regulation and net neutrality have a long history in the United 
States. To fully understand the history of Internet regulation, it is important to 
first look at how other forms of transmissions were regulated before the 
development of the Internet. In 1934, under President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, the Communications Act of 1934 was passed.60 This Act regulated 
interstate and foreign communication by radio or wire.61 The main development 
from this Act was replacing the Federal Radio Commission with the Federal 
Communications Commission (the “FCC”) and transferring regulation of 
telephone communications from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the 
FCC.62 Therefore, under the Act, the FCC became the commission regulating 
and overseeing United States telephone, telegraph, television, and radio 
communications.63 Additionally, the Act expanded the idea of common carriers 
to electronic communication, which was a novel concept at the time.64 Under the 
Act, the electronic communication forms, defined as common carriers, were 
required to be end-to-end neutral in their transmission of data.65 The seminal 
case in defining the end-to-end neutrality requirement of the Act was Hush-A-
Phone Corp. v. United States.66 In this case, the petitioner argued that the FCC’s 
ruling that its product was deleterious to the telephone system and injured the 
services rendered by the telephone service was incorrect and the petitioner’s 
complaint regarding the tariffs imposed by the telephone service should not have 
been dismissed by the FCC.67 The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner 
and ruled that the FCC’s decision that the Hush-A-Phones were a public 
detriment was erroneous.68 Therefore, Hush-A-Phone Corp’s product was being 
subjected to unwarranted tariffs by phone operators because the product’s utility 
was privately beneficial and had no public detriment.69 The court remanded the 







59 Id.  




64 Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Network Neutrality: A History of Common Carrier Laws 1884–2018, 
MEDIUM (Dec. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@TebbaVonMathenstien/network-neutrality-a-history-
of-common-carrier-laws-1884-2018-2b592f22ed2e. 
65 Id. 
66 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
67 Id. at 267. 
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B. THE RISE OF THE INTERNET ERA 
 
The Internet first emerged in the 1980’s. Throughout the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, the only form of connection to the Internet was dial-up through 
one’s telephone service provider.70 Based on this model, the Internet at the time 
qualified as a common carrier under the Communications Act of 1934. 
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Telecom Act”) was passed 
under President Bill Clinton.71 The Telecom Act did not completely supplant the 
Communications Act of 1934 but made changes under Title II common 
carriers.72 The goal of the Telecom Act was to promote competition in 
communication services by allowing anyone to enter the communications 
business while still ensuring that all citizens had access to advance 
communications systems at affordable prices.73 The Telecom Act was the first 
piece of legislation in the United States to directly address Internet access.74 It 
required that the FCC facilitate the deployment of broadband Internet 
capabilities to all Americans.75  
 In 2002, under President George W. Bush, the FCC adopted a 
declaratory ruling, which classified broadband Internet service providers as Title 
I information service providers under the Communications Act of 1934 instead 
of Title II common carriers or telecommunication services.76 This resulted in the 
Internet becoming largely unregulated.77 The FCC stated that its decision was 
promoted by policy goals that included encouraging the ubiquitous availability 
of broadband access to the Internet to all Americans, ensuring that broadband 
services exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and 
innovation, and developing an analytical framework that is consistent across 
multiple platforms.78 In 2005, various petitioners sought review of the FCC 
declaratory ruling by the United States Supreme Court. In National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association. v. Brand X Internet Services, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the FCC’s interpretation of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 classifying broadband Internet service providers as information 
service providers instead of telecommunications services was a reasonable 
interpretation.79 The Court reasoned that the high-speed wire was used in 
connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet 





70 Belle Mellor, The Slow Death of Dial Up, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2007), https://www.economist. 
com/technology-quarterly/2007/03/08/the-slow-death-of-dial-up. 
71 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). 
72 Joseph Gattuso, The United States Telecommunications Act of 1996, GLOBAL COMMC’NS 
INTERACTIVE (1998), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/opadhome/overview.htm. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Hanlong Fu et al., The Impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the Broadband Age, 8 
COMM. ADVANCES IN COMM. AND MEDIA RES. (2015). 
76 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities; Internet 
Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 02-77, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1000 (2005). 
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C. NET NEUTRALITY 
 
The term “net neutrality” was initially coined by University of Virginia 
Professor of Law Tim Wu in 2003.81 His paper examined the concept of net 
neutrality in telecommunications policy.82 Wu’s paper was one of the first 
analyses of net neutrality and made a case for a broadband discrimination regime 
as an alternative to the structural regime of completely open access.83 
In 2005, the FCC published its policy of new principles to preserve and 
promote the open and interconnected nature of public Internet.84 It outlined the 
following principles that the FCC aimed to incorporate into its ongoing 
policymaking activities: (1) consumers are entitled to access lawful Internet 
content of their choice; (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and 
services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3) consumers 
are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; 
and (4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers, and content providers.85 
In 2007, various Comcast consumers began to notice that the company was 
limiting the usage of certain technologies such as BitTorrent over their Comcast 
broadband connections.86 After various tests were done by organizations such as 
the Associated Press, it was revealed that Comcast was in fact targeting peer-to-
peer Internet traffic.87 Free Press filed a complaint with the FCC.88 The FCC 
ruled that Comcast’s practices were in violation of the Telecom Act, and its 
policy was an unreasonable form of network regulation.89 The FCC cited to 
Comcast selectively impeding and blocking certain types of applications such as 
BitTorrents.90 It found that this disparate treatment directly opposed the goal of 
the Telecom Act and posed significant risks of anticompetitive abuses by 
companies.91 Comcast was ordered to disclose to the FCC its network 
management practices, submit a new compliance strategy to describe its plan to 
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disclose to the FCC the details of the new network management system to be put 
into practice.92 Comcast appealed the decision by the FCC, and the D.C. Court 
of Appeals in Comcast Corp. v. FCC ruled in favor of Comcast on the grounds 
that the FCC did not have the ancillary authority to regulate Comcast under the 
Telecom Act.93 
In response to Comcast v. FCC and growing concern over an open and free 
Internet, the FCC developed more regulations in its Open Internet Order of 
2010.94 Adopted on December 21, 2010, the Open Internet Order set forth three 
basic rules: (i) transparency; (ii) no blocking; and (iii) no unreasonable 
discrimination.95 Transparency regulations stated that fixed and mobile 
broadband providers must disclose the network management practices, 
performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband 
services.96 The no blocking rule applies to fixed broadband providers in that they 
may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, 
and mobile broadband providers may not block lawful websites or block 
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services.97 The last 
rule of no unreasonable discrimination only applies to fixed broadband providers 
in that those providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful 
network traffic.98 
In 2011, Verizon sued the FCC over its Open Internet Order, arguing that 
the order exceeded the FCC’s authority.99 In Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals set out to determine whether the FCC’s rules fell outside of the scope 
of its statutory authority.100 The court ruled that the no blocking and no 
unreasonable discrimination provisions from the Open Internet Order could only 
be shown to apply to common carriers, and, therefore, since broadband providers 
are specifically separated from common carriers per the Telecom Act, the FCC 
could not impose those rules on broadband providers.101 
In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) updated its 2002 Letter 
that advised search engines about the potential for consumers to be deceived in 
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.102 The letter advised search engines to 
ensure that consumers are able to distinguish natural search results from 
advertisements delivered by the search engine.103 
Under the administration of President Obama in 2015, the FCC voted to 
regulate broadband Internet service as a public utility and adopt various rules in 
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Order”).104 Specifically, the FCC reclassified broadband Internet access service 
providers to fall under Title II of the Telecom Act.105 The Net Neutrality Order 
defined broadband Internet access service as: 
 
A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the 
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or 
substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities 
that are incidental to and enable the operation of the 
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access 
service. This term also encompasses any service that the 
Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the 
service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to 
evade the protections set forth in this Part.106 
 
In addition, the Net Neutrality Order set forth the following rules to protect 
consumers from tactics that threaten the open Internet:  
 
1. Clear, Bright-Line Rules 
 
The clear, bright-line rules adopted by the FCC included banning the use of 
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.107 The no blocking rule protected 
the rights of consumers in that a consumer who subscribes to a retail broadband 
Internet service must get what he or she pays for.108 The ban on blocking states, 
“[a] person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, 
services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network 
management.”109 The no throttling rule guards against degradation targeted at 
specific uses of a customer’s broadband connection.110 This rule protects against 
a broadband service from avoiding the no blocking rule by effectively but not 
actually blocking a website or application by degrading the Internet traffic to a 
point where the application or website is essentially unusable.111The order states, 
“[a] person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or degrade lawful Internet 
traffic on the basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a non-
harmful device, subject to reasonable network management.”112 The last rule 
prohibiting paid prioritization protected against the use of payment for a 
broadband Internet service provider to manage its network in a way that benefits 
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The rule states that a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet 
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid 
prioritization. ‘Paid prioritization’ refers to the management of a broadband 
provider’s network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, 
including through the use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, 
resource reservation, or other forms of preferential traffic management, either 
(a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or 
(b) to benefit an affiliated entity.114 Both the no blocking and no throttling rules 
are subject to an exception for “reasonable network management.”115 Paid 
prioritization has no exception for reasonable network management because 
paid prioritization is a business practice and not a network management 
practice.116 Reasonable network management is defined in the Net Neutrality 
Order as a practice that has a primarily technical network management 
justification, but does not include other business practices. A network 
management practice is reasonable if it is primarily used for and tailored to 
achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the 
particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access 
service.117 
 
2. No Unreasonable Interference or Unreasonable Disadvantage to 
Consumers or Edge Providers 
 
As gatekeepers of information on the Internet, the FCC decided it is the duty 
of broadband Internet access providers to make sure they are not using that 
gatekeeping role to unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage 
consumers or edge providers.118 This rule acts as a catch all provision for 
anything that the clear, bright-line rules would not outright prohibit.119  
The rule mentions that any person engaged in the provision of broadband 
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not 
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users’ ability 
to select, access, and use broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet 
content, applications, services, or devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’ 
ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or devices available to end 
users. Reasonable network management shall not be considered a violation of 
this rule.120 
 
3. Enhanced Transparency 
 
This rule from the Open Internet Order of 2010 remained in full effect and 
was not revised by the FCC in the Net Neutrality Order. The rule states that a 
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publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management 
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access 
services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of 
such services and for content, application, service, and device providers to 
develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.121 
Shortly after the Net Neutrality Order was adopted, the issue of whether the 
FCC was able to reclassify broadband Internet access providers to fall under 
Title II was brought before the D.C Court of Appeals.122 In U.S. Telecom 
Association v. FCC, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC had statutory 
authority under § 706 of the Telecom Act to reclassify broadband as a 
telecommunication service.123 
 
D. THE REPEAL OF NET NEUTRALITY 
 
In 2017, under a new administration, the FCC voted 3-2 to repeal the Net 
Neutrality Order.124 The repeal was adopted on December 14, 2017, with the 
publication of the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order (the “Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order”).125 The repeal reversed the reclassification of 
broadband Internet access providers from telecommunications services back to 
information services.126 The FCC additionally eliminated the rules created in the 
Net Neutrality Order.127 The FCC also reverted the transparency requirements 
for Internet service providers back to what was required under the Open Internet 
Order of 2010.128 The Restoring Internet Freedom Order stated the reasons for 
the repeal were that (i) the cost of the rules to innovation and investment 
outweigh any benefits, (ii) there is no identifiable source of legal authority to 
justify the conduct rules adopted under the Net Neutrality Order, and (iii) 
conduct rules are unnecessary because the transparency rule together with 
antitrust and consumer protection laws ensure that consumers have redress if any 
Internet service provider engages in behavior that is contrary to Internet 
freedom.129 
 In response to the repeal, several technology companies filed lawsuits 
in an attempt to preserve net neutrality protections.130 Additionally, twenty-two 
state attorneys general filed lawsuits to preserve net neutrality.131 The lawsuit, 
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prohibits the FCC from “arbitrary and capricious” redactions to existing 
policies.132 
Many states have adopted legislation to reinstate the net neutrality rules 
within their borders. California adopted net neutrality legislation as of August 
2018.133 Governors in several states, including Montana, New York, and Hawaii, 
have signed executive orders requiring Internet service providers that do 
business with the state to adhere to net neutrality principles.134 
 
 




The history and current rules for three forms of Internet regulation across 
the globe have now been reviewed. The EU adheres to net neutrality regulations, 
France enforces platform neutrality regulations, and the United States regulates 
the Internet through transparency rules along with general antitrust and 
consumer protection laws. A comparison and determination of which regulation 
method is preferable may take many different factors into account. For this 
analysis, the two primary factors that will be evaluated are economic impact and 
social impact.  
 
A. NET NEUTRALITY 
 
The EU’s current net neutrality regulations have been in place for several 
years. However, in this short period of time, various scholarly articles have been 
written on whether the EU should keep the current regulations, add platform 
neutrality regulations, or let the market regulate itself. The European Parliament 
stated in 2017 that “the need for net neutrality and fair and non-discriminatory 
access to online platforms is a prerequisite for innovation and a truly competitive 
market.”135 Yet, innovation and a competitive market are arguably more in line 
with less regulation. Thus, net neutrality prioritizes the prevention of negative 
social impacts but fails to have a positive economic impact on Internet service 
providers, platforms, or consumers. 
From an economic standpoint, studies have shown that innovation and a 
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instead of a net neutrality regime.136 A purely economic view supports that a 
discriminatory regime is more beneficial in terms of investments, innovation, 
and total welfare.137 When Internet service providers are allowed to differentiate 
between Internet traffic speeds and access, the investment by both platforms and 
Internet users increases.138 However, while this increases total welfare, it can 
disproportionately harm certain groups. These investments negatively impact 
platform profits. Additionally, more research is needed on whether a user’s 
utility in higher broadband speeds is commensurate with the investment made 
by that user.139 
In terms of social impact, the regulation of Internet service providers under 
net neutrality allows users to exercise their rights to access and distribute 
information.140 Net neutrality also enables businesses to reach consumers. 
Therefore, neutral Internet access can be said to be essential for competition and 
innovation on the Internet as it relates to platforms and consumers. Additionally, 
a discriminatory regime disproportionately and negatively impacts small 
platforms.141 Smaller platforms may not have the capacity to invest in higher 
broadband speeds which would stifle innovation if the platform required those 
speeds to function properly. Lastly, under a net neutrality regime, there is little 
to no risk of sabotage by Internet service providers to platforms.142 Internet 
service providers have no benefit to slowing down Internet speeds or blocking 
access if the principles of net neutrality are in place. 
Therefore, net neutrality lacks certain economic benefits but has a positive 
social impact. It lacks the total economic benefits that a discriminatory regime 
may have but takes important steps to protect society and its right to access and 
distribute information. The EU’s net neutrality regulations have various social 
benefits but may not be the perfect fit for the United States which has a tendency 
to prioritize economic incentives over social concerns. 
 
B. PLATFORM NEUTRALITY 
 
France’s recent platform neutrality laws have sparked many discussions. 
While the long-term effects and challenges to these laws have not yet been 
realized, various scholars have begun to predict what will occur under the 
platform neutrality regime. Platform neutrality goes a step further at regulating 
the Internet by focusing on the neutrality of platforms that the Internet service 
providers give consumers access to. In its purest form, platform neutrality has 
economic benefits and a positive social impact. However, while France has 
taken the most substantial steps of any country toward adopting pure platform 
neutrality, it is practically impossible for Internet platforms to be completely 
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content is listed. France’s platform neutrality rules focus on ensuring that 
Internet platforms provide consumers with fair, clear, and transparent 
information.  
In regard to economic impact, the platform neutrality principles differ from 
those seen in net neutrality. The total welfare is lower when search platforms 
use a sponsored ranking system for content or products that are equal in 
quality.143 The sponsored ranking system is a form of discriminatory regime that 
France’s platform neutrality rules do not explicitly ban. Instead, France 
addresses the issue of a sponsored ranking system by requiring clear and 
transparent information regarding how items, websites, and the like are ranked 
or listed by a platform. In a sponsored ranking system, the top position in the 
sponsored rank is the most valuable.144 The value of this position means that the 
provider of the product in this position pays a search platform for this top ranked 
position, but in order to make a profit, it will then have to charge more for its 
product.145 Therefore, the search platform will profit to the detriment of both the 
consumer and the provider of products.146 The consumer will be left worse off 
because their choice will be factually limited.147 Consumers also will not 
consider the less prominent product or content providers, and they will be 
directed to higher-priced or less relevant content or products.148 France’s 
platform neutrality principles guard against the consumer confusion that occurs 
in a sponsored ranking system.  
The social impact of platform neutrality takes the strictest approach of the 
three to protecting freedom of speech and transparency. Current legal 
frameworks are unable to account for Internet platforms’ unique role in the 
world which necessitate the rules for platform neutrality. Dominant platforms 
on the Internet have taken on a utility-like role that comes with various 
obligations, including as an infrastructure for freedom of expression.149 Unlike 
a physical store, platforms have an endless amount of diverse information 
available.150 Because of this new role, platform neutrality is adding information 
to search platforms and limiting the power of those platforms to censor 
information.151 Additionally, platform neutrality guards against the distortion of 
a level playing field for competing products or content providers and the 
deterioration of content quality and content variety displayed on platforms.152 
As discussed under economic impact, competing products in a sponsored 
ranking system that are on all practical accounts equal will not be treated equally 
on the platform and ultimately by the consumer. This will mislead the consumer 
in purchases and in his or her perception of product prices and availability.153 
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who do not receive priority will be at a disadvantage and be forced to exit the 
market.154 Under France’s platform neutrality rules, these issues will not occur. 
The goal of France’s law is to force Internet platforms to provide fair, clear, and 
transparent information to consumers. By enforcing these requirements, France 
will avoid the negative social impacts that occur without platform neutrality. 
Therefore, platform neutrality has positive economic and social impacts. 
Regulating platforms maximizes total welfare and ensures the protections of 
freedom of speech and transparency. In addition, platform neutrality protects 
consumers and ensures that platforms are not pushed out of the market unfairly. 
 
C. A DISCRIMINATORY REGIME 
 
The United States’ Restoring Internet Freedom Order focused on removing 
the net neutrality rules. The current state of the Internet is a discriminatory 
regime that is regulated through the transparency principle stated by the 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order and general antitrust and consumer protection 
rules and regulations. Proponents of this view have many arguments for why this 
is the correct way to monitor the Internet. Some argue that there should not be 
specific laws governing complex areas in need of regulation and that instead the 
Internet should be assessed by general legal principles that have always 
existed.155 On the other side of the argument, authors argue that a new regulatory 
framework needs to be developed because the current legal framework, 
including antitrust and consumer protection laws, are not sufficient for the 
specific needs of Internet regulation.156 While acknowledging both sides of the 
argument, we will focus our review of a discriminatory regime in terms of 
economic and social impact. A discriminatory regime has a predominantly 
positive economic impact but has negative social consequences. 
A discriminatory regime for the Internet is economically beneficial.157 Marc 
Bourreau compared net neutrality regimes and discriminatory regimes from a 
purely economic standpoint.158 In this analysis, he used the idea of Internet 
service providers that had two “lanes” of Internet traffic; a priority or fast lane 
and a regular lane.159 In this economic analysis, he concluded that a 
discriminatory regime is more beneficial in terms of investments, innovation, 
and total welfare.160 In terms of investments, a discriminatory regime that 
includes priority and non-priority Internet speeds will have platforms investing 
in increased broadband capacity.161 By allowing platforms to invest in higher 
Internet speeds, the Internet service providers are receiving additional revenues 
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capacity increases demand and the costs but also leads to an increase in the 
revenues an Internet service provider can receive.163 Innovation increases with 
a discriminatory regime because certain platforms are not able to effectively 
work on the “regular lane” or general Internet speed and would be left out of the 
market without the ability to invest in the priority Internet speeds.164 Internet 
service providers invest more in capacity in a discriminatory regime so that the 
total number of active platforms is greater.165 The total welfare is increased by a 
discriminatory regime although the exact impact on welfare to the individual 
parties cannot be calculated as a practical matter.166 The overall effect on the 
economy in a discriminatory regime is always positive in that prioritization leads 
to a more efficient system.167 The total congestion of Internet traffic is lowered 
by a discriminatory regime because Internet service providers are better able to 
manage Internet traffic when there are multiple “lanes” of traffic.168 Therefore, 
from an economic standpoint, there is the most to gain from having an open 
Internet based on a discriminatory regime. 
However, looking at the social impact of a discriminatory regime, there are 
a variety of problematic areas. There must be some monitoring of the Internet to 
make sure that smaller platforms are not being disproportionately and negatively 
impacted. Additionally, in a discriminatory regime, Internet service providers 
are more readily able to sabotage or manipulate both platforms and 
consumers.169 Sabotage or manipulation can occur by Internet service providers 
in various ways. First, there is the fear of degradation of the non-priority access 
“lanes” in order to extract higher profits from priority access users. By lowering 
the broadband access of the non-priority “lane,” Internet service providers can 
force platforms to upgrade to the high priority “lane” out of necessity to ensure 
consumers are able to access their platform which leads to profits for the Internet 
service provider.170 Internet service providers may also sabotage access to 
certain platforms. This leaves consumers worse off in that they are not given 
access to all of the information that should be readily available to them on the 
Internet. In turn, this will lead to the deterioration of content quality and variety 
because platforms will leave the market if they are being disadvantaged by 
Internet service providers and unable to make a profit.171 Manipulation of 
consumers may also occur by platforms in a discriminatory regime. Platforms 
act as the gatekeepers of content and may use profiling practices to gain an 
advantage over consumers.172 Platforms may use consumer data to restrict 
certain products or content available to them. This may result in discriminatory 
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While the United States’ discriminatory regime is economically efficient, it 
lacks some of the social protections that are desirable for a society. A 
discriminatory regime benefits investment, innovation, and the overall welfare 
of society but at a cost to the freedom and growth of consumers and platforms. 
 
 




While the discriminatory regime is the most economically efficient of the 
three methods, it should be applied in conjunction with specific net neutrality 
rules and more transparency regulations for both Internet service providers and 
Internet platforms. As previously stated, a discriminatory regime that includes 
limited transparency rules relating to Internet service providers and general 
antitrust and consumer protection laws is not enough to protect against the social 
concerns that arise in a discriminatory Internet regime.  
General antitrust and consumer protection laws are not properly tailored to 
be effective methods of Internet protection. The FTC has broad authority to 
police conduct that goes against fair competition or that harms consumers.174 
However, the FTC has taken little action to protect consumers, platforms, or 
even Internet service providers relating to Internet usage. Because the FTC is a 
primarily reactive agency and is not engaged in rulemaking, it is extremely 
difficult for the FTC to understand the principles guiding improper Internet 
activity as it falls under antitrust or consumer protection laws.175 The FTC is not 
an appropriate group to police Internet usage absent guidelines from another 
authority. Therefore, antitrust and consumer protection laws in their current form 
are not effective means for regulating the Internet, and other steps must be taken. 
The United States’ transparency rule takes a step to mitigate negative social 
impacts but does not go far enough. The current rule for transparency states that 
an Internet service provider must publicly disclose information about its network 
management practices, performance characteristics, and commercial terms of its 
broadband Internet access services.176 Transparency in and of itself does not 
limit the behavior of the Internet service providers, and therefore, further steps 
should be taken. First, the transparency rules for Internet service providers 
should be reviewed and revised so as to ensure Internet service providers are not 
taking advantage of consumers or platforms. Next, the United States should look 
at France’s platform neutrality regulations to begin adopting transparency 
requirements for platforms within the United States. While the word platform 
neutrality may conjure up images of a platform that is void of all preference and 
completely neutral, this is not a plausible or correct reading of France’s 
regulations which are labeled as platform neutrality laws. France’s platform 
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disclose the practices that are being used that are not substantively neutral. 
Platforms should be required to acknowledge their active role in managing 
content and products, and this can be done through strict transparency guidelines 
similar to those of France. 
Additionally, the FCC should adopt net neutrality rules. While the EU’s net 
neutrality rules are comprehensive, the negative economic impact that would 
occur from implementing the same standards should incentivize the United 
States to develop more specific and streamlined rules. The FCC should review 
the net neutrality rules imposed in 2015 under the Net Neutrality Order and 
consider revisions and then reinstate the rules. The clear bright-line rules from 
the Net Neutrality Order all correlate to the social concerns that a discriminatory 
regime brings to light. Blocking and degradation are two prominent concerns 
from a social impact standpoint that were directly addressed by the Net 
Neutrality Order. Reinstatement of specific net neutrality rules and more 
comprehensive transparency rules for Internet service providers and platforms 
would allow for positive economic growth while still limiting that growth to 
account for social concerns. 
A discriminatory Internet regime with limited transparency rules and 
general antitrust and consumer protection laws do not go far enough to protect 
society. Therefore, the current discriminatory regime in place in the United 
States must be paired with additional transparency rules that include Internet 
platforms and net neutrality rules that prevent Internet service providers from 






After close examination of the EU’s net neutrality regulations, France’s 
recent platform neutrality regulations, and the United States’ current 
discriminatory regime that imposes transparency requirements on Internet 
service providers, it is clear that there is no “one size fits all” model for 
regulation of the Internet. Each country has a different history for how its own 
regulatory scheme has progressed and the policy initiatives that the country 
deems important in regulating the Internet. The EU’s use of net neutrality takes 
a strong stance on protecting social welfare but does not necessarily take the best 
approach towards economic optimization of the Internet. Platform neutrality 
utilized by France takes the United States’ transparency rules for Internet service 
providers a step further by enforcing platforms to abide by transparency 
standards and imposing fines for the failure to do so. The United States’ 
discriminatory Internet regime, which incorporates transparency requirements 
for Internet service providers, is the most economically beneficial model for 
regulation but fails to protect from the negative impacts on society. By looking 
to France’s use of platform neutrality and the United States’ former Net 
Neutrality Order, the United States can implement certain rules that will help 
protect society without stifling the economic benefits of a discriminatory 
Internet regime. 
Looking forward to the future of Internet regulation, there are almost 
certainly still changes on the horizon. The EU’s net neutrality laws may change 
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guidelines it published in 2016. While the Regulation takes precedent over the 
national law of member states, the guidelines present very detailed 
recommendations of what net neutrality means and should look like throughout 
Europe.177 The Regulation gives independent national telecom regulators the 
power and the mandate to protect net neutrality in their respective countries.178 
To do this, the independent regulators are told to take the utmost account of the 
guidelines issued by BEREC.179 Various telecom companies in the EU have 
been arguing for BEREC to loosen its guidelines to make the use of 5G phone 
network service more viable and economically impactful.180 
In France, Decree No. 2017-1435 of 29 September 2017 became 
enforceable as of January 1, 2019. In the coming years, the decrees for platform 
neutrality, including their enforcement and revisions, should be monitored both 
for economic and social impacts. The long-term impacts of platform neutrality 
regulations should be reviewed in depth as more is learned from observing the 
enforcement or lack thereof of these decrees. 
In the United States, the battle over how the Internet should be regulated 
continues. More than half of the states have found one way or another to oppose 
the most recent act of repealing net neutrality by the FCC.181 The issue seems to 
fall across party border lines with Democrats in favor of net neutrality rules and 
regulations and Republicans favoring less regulation.182 States have taken 
opposition through suing the FCC, introducing state legislation, and enhancing 
requirements for companies receiving state or government grants.183 However, 
the FCC is fighting back. The Department of Justice sued California in late 2018 
for its law regarding net neutrality based on the federal government’s 
jurisdiction over interstate commerce.184 While no judgments have been 
rendered in these cases, the decisions should be monitored as they will have an 
impact on the future of Internet regulation. Additionally, the 2020 presidential 
election may bring about more changes in Internet regulation. 
Further research should be done on the different forms of Internet 
regulation’s specific economic and social impact. In addition, there are other 
methods of measuring the effectiveness of forms of Internet regulation that were 
not addressed in this Note. Further consideration of other measurements should 
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